CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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28 May 1976

Mr. William P. Bundy
Foreign Affairs
58 East 68th Street
New York, New York 10021

Dear Bill:

Some time ago I promised you a reply to your thoughtful letter. It has taken longer than I expected because the concern you express inspired me to ask for a review of our situation.

Your thesis as we understand it is that the overt, analytic side of the Agency should be organizationally divorced from the clandestine. This would open the door to a reestablishment of close links between intelligence analysis and the intellectual resources of the universities. Confronting this, we have asked ourselves four questions. What is the present state of these relationships? What improvements could be achieved by the divorce you propose? What would be its costs? Would the costs be worth the gain?

Let me say at the beginning that our problem of standing with the "mainstream" is much narrower in one sense and much broader in another than you imply.

It is narrower because the opposition in principle to clandestine operations is aimed mainly at covert action, and is confined to a relatively small but highly articulate and influential group. These critics are strongest in the major universities, and strongest there in the Establishment ones. With a few exceptions, they represent the liberal arts and social sciences rather than the physical sciences, and within the social sciences they do not include many scholars of Communist societies. On the other hand, your "mainstream" strongly

influences the editorial (and the news) content of certain familiar publications, ones that are able to build a sort of prison of fashionable attitudes. When we deal with the currents of intellectual life outside prison walls, we find a great deal of support for the Agency and its mission.

On the other hand, the problem is much broader than intelligence. The "mainstream" has, to varying degrees, turned its back on defense and on foreign policy. A few will have nothing to do with government itself. A much greater number believe, with some justification, that our national energies should be concentrated on domestic problems. Their concern over intelligence issues is obviously great, partly because these issues epitomize for them the misdirection of American society. Nonetheless, it is more an expression of a broader legitimate debate over priorities and credibility than the underlying cause of the debate. We are convinced that acceptance by these people of the Agency, or of its present analytic component, as a respectable participant in American intellectual life must wait until they rediscover that guilt is no substitute for foreign policy in a less than benign world, and until they determine that it is respectable to participate and assist in national government. There are some encouraging signs that this is beginning to happen.

Even then, I concede, we will have problems, but not as great as you anticipate. The fact is that we have never been isolated from academia even during the worst of the recent period. In fact, we are less "monastic" now than we have ever been. The difference is that many of the people with whom we deal find it necessary to be circumspect if they are not to be hounded by the emotional and the trendy among their colleagues. For this reason you and many others are probably unaware just how deep and extensive these relationships are. They require the assignment of an officer full-time as Coordinator. Some examples, from the liberal arts and social sciences, at the risk of inflicting on you a statistic or two:

-- You speak of the immense amount of contact that "used to exist" between the overt side and the universities. One Office alone, the Office of Political Research (formed when ONE was broken up), has maintained through all the nastiness of the past few years regular and active exchange:

° At Harvard, Princeton, Stanford, MIT, Amherst, etc., with 39 senior faculty;

° At Chicago, California, Michigan, etc., with 41 senior faculty;

° At other institutions (including 6 foreign) with 32 senior faculty.

-- You asked how long it has been since a scholar from the outside joined the Agency for a year or so. The answer is that there are two such on board now, and a third is about to join us.

-- You note that our people used to be able to go freely to academic centers. This academic year we have 21 analysts on sabbaticals at various universities. Well over a hundred others, openly identified as CIA, have attended 60 professional meetings (American Political Science Association, etc.) and 30-40 presented papers or were scheduled as discussants.

-- OPR and the Offices of Economic and Strategic Research all have panels of distinguished scholars to review their output and their programs. Many of these people put in a good deal of time at Langley.

-- During the past two years, the Agency conducted three symposia to bring intelligence analysts together with academic leaders in the development of new methods of analysis in the social sciences. The first dealt with a broad range of new methodologies, the second and third with the specific problems of elite analysis and national leadership succession. Nearly 50 scholars from almost as many major universities participated. CIA sponsorship of the symposia was openly revealed, but only one person invited hesitated because of that association.

-- We have a summer intern program for graduate students. This year we will take 74, one out of every nine applicants. Experience suggests that about half will end up as permanent employees.

I think it is in the long run even more important that we are making a major effort to break our product out of its security wrappings. There is already a respectable flow of unclassified or declassified CIA product to the academic world. We expect it to grow.

On the scientific side, by now at least as important as the traditional intelligence disciplines, our relations with the universities have always been close. In recent years our activities in science and technology have grown enormously. A great deal of our analytic work is directed at technological developments and weapon characteristics. Similarly, we are deeply involved in research and development in support of collection and information processing, not only in the obvious areas like photography but also in the integration of technology with clandestine collection.

We draw for these purposes on the full range of American intellectual resources, and few scientists have withheld cooperation. We have contracts with more than 35 senior scientific faculty at major universities, and that many more serve as consultants. Among them are some of the country's most distinguished, including several Nobel laureates. Moreover, we draw on, and depend on, the work done at these institutions, and at research institutes and think tanks. We have full membership in the American scientific community.

In our experience, all but the most hysterical of faculty and students are sophisticated enough to make a distinction between the overt and analytic and the covert and operational, however much they may disapprove of the latter. While our analysts on campus have a great deal of arguing to do, they are not held responsible by their academic colleagues for clandestine activities.

Nor has recruiting suffered. We have far more exceptional applicants than we can take. Many of those that have joined us in recent years are extraordinarily impressive, not only in academic terms but also in professional or military experience. Neither you nor I are in a position to compare these officers with those of whom you speak, but my colleagues who know both groups tell me our newer people measure up. You are quite right, however, that we are not getting from Harvard and Princeton the liberal arts

graduates at the top of their classes. I wish we were, but the fact is that in the 70's these people simply do not appear to be interested in federal service of any kind.

Academic stars aside, the general level of our professional force is much higher today than it was in the 50's. The proportion with graduate degrees (and from first-rate universities) has risen from about 20 to about 45 percent, while the number with no degree has dropped from 35 (!) to 5 percent.

The mass and often indiscriminate intake of professionals in the 50's will not be repeated. It provided many first-rate people, but it also saddled the Agency with a large number of third-raters. Virtually all of these have been eased out in the last few years. With a smaller but steady intake, we are able to be highly selective, a policy that is paying off in the depth of talent and experience available to us.

Adding this all up, we assess our academic relationships not to be in bad shape, especially when we consider the strains to which they have been subjected by largely irrelevant events. Obviously they can be improved. In particular we want to have the very best people from the very best schools competing to join us, and we would prefer that our associates on the campuses did not have to worry over the effect their association might have on their students or their peers. A divorce from the Clandestine Services might help, at least in the latter instance, but its effect on recruitment or on our ability to broaden our present substantive exchanges would be marginal. Any positive change must await fundamental change in the fashionable view of what an intellectual owes to his country, something which we in intelligence can influence very little.

What do we lose by separation of analysis from operations? In our view, a great deal. It is interesting that the Senate Select Committee and its staff opened hearings largely convinced that there should be a divorce and ended, grudgingly, much less convinced. Its recommendation (pp. 449-451, copy enclosed) finally was that the new Oversight Committee should "give consideration" to this idea. Its objective, moreover, was primarily to relieve the DCI of a potential conflict of interest. The Harvard University Institute of Politics, Study Group on Intelligence Activities, produced a paper on this subject which is also quoted in the Select Committee's report (pp. 528-532, copy enclosed). I think the Study Group has the equities about right, especially in the dangers of placing the DDO in State or Defense, or of trying to maintain it in an independent position.

I would put even more weight, however, on the interdependence of the Operations, Intelligence, and Science and Technology Directorates. As you remember, the linkage between the analyst and the clandestine collector was once tenuous indeed. It is still not as close as we would like it, but year by year it improves.

In your letter you treat only with the substantive contribution that the collector can make. I think you downplay far too much the value of lengthy, on-the-scene immersion in a nation's politics, but there is an even more important consideration. We desperately need clandestine collection, but it is complicated and dangerous. We cannot afford to have it operate in a vacuum if it is to operate with reasonable efficiency and minimum risk. It must therefore be closely linked to the analysis function. The greatest value of this relationship, however, comes from the contribution of the analyst, not of the collector. The collector learns from the analyst what sources to seek and what questions to ask. He gets a continuous evaluation of his product. The analyst in turn gets a clear picture of the reliability and access of sources, and he can ask the follow-up questions. Thus, the collection process can be steered to make it more responsive to national requirements, and to make the ultimate product substantially more reliable.

I spoke earlier of the integration of technology and clandestine collection. The scientist who develops an advanced sensor, the clandestine officer who emplaces it, and the analyst who defines the requirement for it and depends on its success are all members of a single team. Experience indicates that the efficiency and responsiveness of collection suffers when it is organizationally and geographically separated from analysis. In the broadest sense, I see my managerial job is to make the Intelligence Community more "communal," to seek greater integration and cooperation among all its components. Fragmentation is not the answer.

In sum, we come out with different answers from yours on the four questions posed earlier. First, our external relationships in this country, while hardly ideal, are not in bad shape. Certainly they have not been so damaged that radical surgery is essential. Second, we doubt that the surgery you propose would cure the patient; our particular difficulties are symptoms of a more general malady. Third, we rate the costs and risks of the operation considerably higher than you do. Finally, as we add these answers up in May 1976, the costs do not seem worth the gains.

One additional point. I think you will find that the concept of an analytic function independent of policymaking is firmly lodged in doctrine. Our officers from top to bottom take

it seriously indeed. Had I any mind to change it (thus breaking a heartfelt pledge made at my Senate confirmation hearings), I would lose our best people by platoons. Nor are they unaware that they have no monopoly on knowledge and wisdom. They are encouraged to face outward, to seek information and advice wherever it may be had, and to engage in informed debate with their lay colleagues. And this exchange, even in these harried times, continues to be fruitful.

I do not wish to appear complacent, however. We have not had time to assess the impact on the public of the Select Committee's report. Its treatment of our relationships with academia has already produced some negative noises in academic circles. In any case, there is no question that the nation's confidence in its intelligence service has been shaken; restoration of that confidence is my highest priority.

For now, our emphasis is on seeking greater understanding in the Congress and the press. After a few months, we will take another look. If organizational measures look sensible, we'll take them. As you point out, these are not things to be rushed.

Again, many thanks for your letter. As you can see, we take these questions seriously. And it is healthy that we can debate them seriously with our distinguished alumni. I hope we can count on your continued advice and support.

Sincerely,

George Bush
Director

Enclosures

RLehman:lm
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G. REORGANIZATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

*1. The Position of the DCI*

The Committee recommendations regarding the Director of Central Intelligence (pages 43–45) would, if implemented, increase his authority over the entire intelligence community. Given such increased authority, the Committee believes that both the executive branch and the intelligence oversight committee(s) of Congress should give careful consideration to removing the DCI from direct management responsibility for the Central Intelligence Agency. This would free the DCI to concentrate on his responsibilities with regard to the entire intelligence community and would remove him from any conflict of interest in performing that task. It might also increase the accountability of the Central Intelligence Agency by establishing a new and separate senior position—a Director of the Central Intelligence Agency—responsible for only the CIA.

*2. The Structures of the CIA*

The Committee believes that several important problems uncovered in the course of this inquiry suggest that serious consideration also be given to major structural change in the CIA—in particular, sepa-

[illegible] This recommendation parallels the current provisions of the War Powers Resolution which could be so amended. (Appendix C, Hearings, Vol. 7, p. 226.)

rating national intelligence production and analysis from the clandestine service and other collection functions. Intelligence production could be placed directly under the DCI, while clandestine collection of foreign intelligence from human and technical sources and covert operations would remain in the CIA.

The advantages of such a step are several:

—The DCI would be removed from the conflict of interest situation of managing the intelligence community as a whole while also directing a collection agency.

—The concern that the DCI's national intelligence judgments are compromised by the impulse to justify certain covert action operations or by the close association of the analysts with the clandestine service would be remedied.

—The problem, seen by some in the intelligence community, of bias on the part of CIA analysts toward the collection resources of the CIA would be lessened.

—It would facilitate providing the intelligence production unit with greater priority and increased resources necessary for improving the quality of its finished intelligence.

—Tighter policy control of the Clandestine Service by the National Security Council and the Department of State would be possible.

—The Director would be able to focus increased attention on monitoring Clandestine Services.

—Internal reorganization of the Directorate for Intelligence and the remainder of the CIA could be facilitated.

There are potential drawbacks as well:

—The Director of Central Intelligence might lose the influence that is part of having command responsibility for the clandestine services.

—The increasing, though still not extensive, contact between national intelligence analysts and the Clandestine Service for the purpose of improving the espionage effort might be inhibited.

—The DCI would have managerial responsibility over the former CIA analysts which might place him in a conflict-of-interest situation in regard to the production of intelligence.

—The increased number of independent agencies would increase the DCI's coordination problems.

—If the clandestine services did not report to the DCI, there would be the problem of establishing an alternative chain of command to the President.

—The Clandestine Service might be downgraded and fail to secure adequate support.

Nonetheless, on balance, the Committee believes such a separation of functions and consequent possible realignments in authority within the intelligence community medit serious consideration.

*Recommendations*

41. The intelligence oversight committee(s) of Congress in the course of developing a new charter for the intelligence community should give consideration to separating the functions of the DCI and the Director of the CIA and to dividing the intelligence analysis and production functions from the clandestine collection and covert action functions of the present CIA.

*4. Organizational Alternatives for the Clandestine Services*

*a. Alternatives.*—There are four alternatives for location of the clandestine services (CS) of the CIA (in this outline the term clandestine services is used in preference to either DDO or DDP in order to avoid confusion):

1. State Department—The CS could be moved to the State Department and either be consolidated with State Department functions or be organized as a quasi-independent agency under a State Department umbrella (the ACDA model).
2. Department of Defense—The CS could be made a civilian operating agency of the Department of Defense reporting to the Secretary of Defense.
3. Independent Agency—The CS could be established as an entirely independent agency of Government reporting to the President through the National Security Council.
4. Status Quo—The CS could be maintained as part of a central intelligence function. Presumably its size and mission would be reduced.

*b. Assumptions.*—To discuss the above options rationally, one must make certain assumptions about the future need of the United States for CS. This outline assumes that we will want to maintain: a clandestine collection capacity; an international counterintelligence capability; and an ability to engage in some traditional covert action functions, but that the actual level of covert action will be drastically reduced. It also assumes that we will want our clandestine collection, counterintelligence and covert action capacities to be targeted as efficiently as possible and controlled as tightly as possible. Further, it is assumed that such functions will benefit from improved cover and other safeguards to clandestinity.

*c. A Note on the Clandestine Services.*—

1. General public opinion stimulated by the Agee book, etc., seems to be that the CIA has engaged in practically wanton intervention in the domestic political affairs of other countries and that this intervention has been a self-sustaining goal of our foreign policy. For the most part, American "intervention" has been motivated by a desire to thwart real or predicted intervention by others—the Soviet Union, China, Cuba. Arguably our policy has been as much or more "counter-interventionist," as "interventionist."
2. It is often forgotten that the CS is not organized solely on geographic lines. A Soviet Bloc division has traditionally stationed case officers in any country there is a Soviet

"presence." The chief purpose of these "specialists" has been to monitor the activities of their KGB counterparts. Informed (though not necessarily unbiased) sources report that "detente" has brought no abatement of KGB activity in Europe, Japan or the less developed countries. This "KGB matching and monitoring" function should probably be at the core of any future CS.

3. Other appropriate roles for the CS include monitoring the activities of internationally operating terrorist groups and exploring third world political intentions regarding economic controls of scarce natural resources.

4. The above functions cannot readily or completely be carried out by overt United States representatives abroad. Such representatives are constrained, as a general proposition, to relations with established elements in the host country. Clandestine representatives can more readily explore the plans of opposition elements. Further, CS officers have carried out important liaison functions with intelligence services of host countries. It is assumed that such liaison should be continued through the CS.

*d. A Note about Organization.*—The CIA is frequently discussed as though it has two component parts—a CS and a directorate of intelligence, which does analysis, estimating and intelligence production (DDP/DDO and DDI). In point of fact, the Agency traditionally has operated with four directorates. In addition to the DDI and the CS, there have been a support directorate (DDS) and a directorate chiefly concerned with science and technology (DDS&T). The DDS contains a very substantial communications component which not only handles communications for the CIA but also, in many parts of the world, for the State Department. The DDI has contained two major "collection" functions—the Foreign Broadcast Information System (FBIS) and the Domestic Contact Service (DCS). The latter, which overtly contacts Americans who travel abroad in order to pick their brains regarding foreign technical and economic developments has been an important source of intelligence. Any rational plan for "divorcing" the CS and the DDI must perforce include consideration of disposition or re-creation of the functions and capacities which reside in the other two directorates (the DDS and the DDS&T), as well as the DDI collection functions (FBIS and DCS).

*e. Goals or Principles.*—Any scheme of organization for the CS should be based upon certain rational goals or principles, though it is impossible to define principles that are entirely consistent with one another. Some suggested principles are set forth below:

1. A responsive and effective intelligence analytic function is vital to the United States—the effectiveness and objectivity of this function should not be compromised by operational considerations; nor should its ability to gain the widest possible input be jeopardized by stigmatization which may result from proximity to covert activities.

2. The requirements of the analytic function should be readily communicated to the clandestine collector. Likewise, the

product of the clandestine collection system should be readily communicated to the intelligence analyst.

3. When appropriate, the President and other policymakers should receive raw clandestine intelligence from an agency that is as disinterested a conduit as possible.

4. The CS should be insulated from political misuse or from Presidential zeal, real or apparent.

5. Clandestine functions should be made as accountable as possible to public representatives, recognizing that secrecy can be a legitimate operational imperative.

6. The "cover" under which clandestine collectors operate should be preserved or improved.

7. The location of the CS should enable continuing evaluation of the relative merit of human intelligence as opposed to technical intelligence.

*f.* The following is an evaluation of the pros and cons of various alternative locations for the CS in light of the assumptions, organizational considerations and goals discussed above.

1. *The State Department Option—*

a. *Pro's*

(i) Might create better unity of foreign service and clandestine reporting, reducing redundancy of effort.

(ii) Might enable better integration of intelligence and foreign policy requirements in general.

(iii) Would enable establishment of independent intelligence analytic function without overlay of operational concerns.

(iv) Would involve placing State's communications back in the State Department.

b. *Con's*

(i) Traditional jealously or suspicion of foreign service officers toward their CS counterparts might cause substantial bureaucratic friction.

(ii) Insulation from political aberration (*e.g.*, the McCarthy period) which in the past had not existed for the State Department might no longer exist for the CS.

(iii) To the extent the CS is called on to perform "covert" functions, the "taint" which these functions are said to place upon the intelligence analytic function could, in effect, be transferred to the entire foreign affairs establishment of the United States Government.

(iv) There may be a penalty in terms of responsiveness of collection to intelligence requirements if clandestine collectors and intelligence analysts are "divorced."

(v) To the extent the CS collects important intelligence information which contradicts DOD perceptions, DOD might claim CS is infected with a "State Department" bias.

2. *The Defense Department Option—*

a. *Pro's*

(i) In terms of size, the DOD could easily envelop the CS.

(ii) A considerable portion of CS cover is already military in nature. Thus there might be some marginal improvement in cover.

(iii) Location in the DOD would not result in a "tainting" of the DOD since it already engages in intelligence and counterintelligence functions.

(iv) Support and R&D functions for CS could readily be merged with DOD components.

b. *Con's*

(i) A Secretary of Defense's span of control is already very wide—query whether he would have the capacity to give adequate direction to the CS.

(ii) Might result in an increasing focus on military-to-military intelligence liaison as opposed to civilian lines of liaison. Such a change in focus may cause problems for command and control, and potentially can affect intelligence production.

(iii) Insulation from political zeal might very well be imperfect because of the traditional military attitude of "can do."

(iv) Civilian control at DOD of military functions is surprisingly "thin." Presumably the CS, if placed in the Pentagon, would be subject to civilian rather than military control and would tax an already overextended group of civilians.

(v) The intelligence reporting of the CS might become tainted by a military bias, real or perceived.

(vi) Because of the size of the DOD, the thinness of civilian control over DOD functions, etc., the net result of placing the CS in the Defense Department might well be to reduce, rather than enhance, CS accountability to the public and Congress.

3. *The Independent Agency Option—*

a. *Pro's*

(i) If it is deemed imperative to split the CS from the intelligence analytic functions of Government, the independent agency model would seem preferable to the State Department or Defense Department models in light of the "cons" outlined above.

(ii) The independent agency would presumably not be a large agency, at least in relative terms. It might give public assurance that the national policy is not being dominated by a clandestine intelligence colossus.

(iii) Tasking of this agency by the NSC directly might avoid the bias or inefficiency which might result in tasking it through the State Department on the one hand or the Defense Department on the other.

b. *Con's*

(i) Cover problems would result. Stateside cover would be difficult without a broader institutional envelop. The small size of the Agency might reduce "clout" in seeking cover slots from other Departments. This fact in turn could create incentives to use of commercial or even "media" cover with attendant societal costs.

(ii) The new agency would be less insulated from Presidential zeal.

(iii) An entire support mechanism would have to be created for this new agency.

(iv) Relationships of such an agency to the science and technology of intelligence collection would be unclear unless it were to have its own costly R&D function.

(v) It might require its own independent communications function.

4. *The Status Quo—*

a. *Pro's*

(i) Current location can assure closest tailoring of clandestine activities to intelligence analytic requirements assuming adequate direction and control.

(ii) The status quo is an evolutionary product which may reflect the wisdom of time.

(iii) It is hard to find a better location.

(iv) Present location is efficient from the point of view of using extant support, communications and R&D functions.

(v) Present location preserves independence of the clandestine function from potential military bias.

b. *Con's*

(i) The CS has been the dominant directorate in the agency and without a "divorce" this domination cannot be terminated.

(ii) History demonstrates that the present location inadequately insulates from the possibility of Presidential zeal.

(iii) Location of clandestine operations in the same agency charged with analytic and estimative functions may have warped and may continue to warp the intelligence product.

(iv) The status quo may be intolerable in light of the disclosures of the Senate Intelligence Committee. One can argue that a shake-up is needed for the sake of a shake-up.

*g. Conclusions*

1. On balance it seems that the status quo, however imperfect, is preferable than any of the three identified options for change. *If* the status quo is maintained, there nonetheless need to be serious changes within the current organizational arrangement:

a. By executive directive or by legislation, a career CS officer should be precluded from appointment as the principal intelligence officer of the U.S. Government.

b. Covert action should be dramatically circumscribed (if it has not already been as a practical result of the House and Senate intelligence committees' hearings and other recent disclosures and legislation).

c. The CS should be substantially reduced in size—the CS should be a more tightly focused operation, focusing on Soviet and Chinese targets and possible other targets of clear and continuing significance to the United States national security, such as resource cartels, and international terrorist activities.

d. To these ends, the CS must be given more rigorous intra- and inter-agency budget and planning scrutiny. Closer evaluation of the CS intelligence product needs to be made. DDI and DDS&T analysts should be required on a quarterly basis, to estimate the usefulness of CS reporting in terms of its percentage contribution to finished intelligence product.

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE



April 12, 1976

TO: Dick Lehman

Please parcel out parts of the Bundy letter to Personnel and other places. I would like to refute where refutation is in order, agree where agreement is in order, rebut where rebuttal is in order.

Personnel, DDI, DDO and others should give a little thought to Bundy's approach. It would be most helpful to me to have you ramrod getting a good, thoughtful reply in order--no rush at all.

Thanks,

GB

George Bush

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE



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April 12, 1976

Dear Bill,

Of course I want to reply to your letter of April 6th, and I want to do so in some detail, but it's going to take me time to digest the contents of that most thoughtful epistle. Dick Lehman and I are going to get to work on it.

You deserve a thorough answer and the putting together of such an answer will be a very worthwhile and educational experience for me. Patience, my friend, in the meantime.

My gratitude,

Sincerely,

George Bush

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WILLIAM P. BUNDY
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April 6, 1976

The Honorable George Bush
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear George:

Thank you very much indeed for having Dick Lehman fit me into his New York schedule two weeks ago. We had a most profitable and interesting lunch, and it was good to catch up with him personally.

At the same time, my subsequent reflections as well as the conversation have left me on the whole more inclined to urge the divorce of the overt parts of the Agency from its covert intelligence, counterintelligence, and operating functions. The arguments against divorce do not seem to me persuasive, while the arguments in its favor seem on reflection even more powerful than they previously had.

First, as your letter stated and Dick argued at greater length, there is the question of where a covert agency would be located within the government--is there "a better home" than CIA as currently constituted? I really don't see the force of this argument at all. The covert agency could report to the White House or the State Department, or perhaps best to a governing committee ~~of three~~ that would be roughly the same as your present three-man executive committee for the whole intelligence community; that is, the head of the overt agency, and someone from the White House, State and Defense. This leaves the question of a name and physical location, and I realize that there might be some difficulty in parceling out the present support elements of the CIA. But it just does not strike me as more than a medium-sized problem of reorganization. The result would be a separate agency with some sort of name of its own.

The second major argument that Dick particularly urged was that the interaction of covert and overt intelligence personnel was in fact extremely helpful to both. Obviously this

is particularly hard for an outsider to judge, and I can remember cases where individuals from the covert side did contribute extraordinary depth and sophistication to our understanding (in ONE) of the situation in particular countries. Yet I also felt that this was the exception, and that for the exceptional individuals involved the separation of organizations need not be a serious barrier. Most of all, with Dick telling me that the overseas covert people are now overwhelmingly targeted on Soviet and Chinese matters, and with a great deal more local expertise and regional specialization now available in the State Department than was the case, for example, in the 1950s, the amount of premium of real country specialists on the covert side would be if anything less than in the days I experienced. And only the exceptional individual, however expert he may be on the darker side of the politics of a given country, can get away from some tendency to stress political maneuver rather than the deeper forces that may be at work in the situation. In other words, any covert intelligence man is primarily an intelligence collector thinking in terms of his priority targets; while he may have a special contribution to the task of evaluation, it is likely to be just that, special, and to be weighed with care by the overall evaluator.

Thus, I simply do not see the principal opposing arguments as very strong. What moves me in the other direction is my strong sense that only through a new, newly labeled and definitely overt agency can one really hope to get three things that seem to me vital:

(1) The recruiting of the most imaginative people available;

(2) Continued refreshing and battery-charging of these people by extensive outside contacts both at home and abroad;

(3) Adequate constructive contact between evaluators and experts and men of wisdom who are not directly associated with the evaluating organization. To be more specific on each of these points:

(1) Whatever the statistical measure of your recruits today, I simply cannot believe that you are getting the really top quality of men that the Agency was able to recruit in the 1950s. As I put it to Dick, how many Drexel Godfreys do you get today--in that case one of the jewels of the Junior Williams faculty? How many Jim Billingtons? In short, how many men who really stand at the very top of their class in first-rate universities? I cannot believe the number is now significant, unless perhaps the man has some particularly strong ideological reason--an element that you want some of but not too much. The

OR DICK LEHMANS?

open-minded, skeptical, truly imaginative minds simply will not come--I believe--to an agency heavily impregnated with a covert side. And while this has something to do with the recent outcry, I think it basically goes deeper and will persist even in a significantly improved climate.

(2) The kind of overt agency I have in mind would have its pores very much more open than has been the case in recent years, when even the best of the men you have (and they are very good indeed) have become largely cut off from the mainstream of academic and practical thinking in the country on their specialties. I would venture that very few of your middle level and senior people have been able in recent years to move freely back and forth to the various centers of thought in this country, a form of refreshment and battery-charging that we used to use to great effect in the 1950s but that must now be virtually impossible in practice--and again because of the association with an agency impregnated by the covert. Your best men today strike me, for all their virtues, as really quite monastic--and as one related test I would suggest checking to see how long it has been since someone from another walk of life came to the Agency for a tour of two or three years on the evaluation side. This used to happen all the time in the 1950s and to the great benefit and liveliness of the shop (here I would group ONE with what were then OCI and ORR).

(3) Again, and at the risk of seeming to glorify the past, my mind goes back to the immense amount of contact that used to exist between the overt side of the house and experts in the various universities and practical organizations who themselves had no tie to the Agency. Time was when ONE people could go to academic settings and centers with great freedom and profit, and I don't think this was just a reflection of a much wider national consensus on policy. Rather it was that the Agency had a very strong overt profile of its own. Now, the events of the last ten years have destroyed that profile so that only a separation could now hope to recreate it.

In sum, George, I remain an unabashed believer in an overt evaluation function conducted separately from any of the policy-making departments. In theory, if one goes back to the 1947 decision to establish evaluation on a centralized basis, one could still argue--as Dean Acheson did--that the best solution would be to keep the old Research and Analysis part of OSS in the State Department under the likes of an Al McCormack or a Bill Langer (whose private autobiography I have just been reading). But the plain fact is that the State Department will never be hospitable to such a group, and a further factor is that from time to time the necessary quality and outside contact

will be severely affected by whether the thinking and acting communities of the country are in sympathy with a particular Secretary of State. One of the great qualities that Allen Dulles managed to preserve in the 1950s was that the best possible thinking about the world abroad could be conducted on a professional basis, dissociated to a significant degree from any particular quirks of policy at a given moment, and thus embracing the inputs of thinkers and actors from the outside who would not ordinarily want to have anything to do with a State Department with which they disagreed--or today with an organization unfortunately tarred by the covert operations in which it engaged on higher authority.

This seems to me a significantly different vision than perhaps now exists in large areas of your staff. None, I suppose, would now recall the extraordinary breadth of talent enlisted in the Office of Facts and Figures of 1940-41, and few would recall the experience of the Research and Analysis part of OSS--or perhaps even the continued openness and wide inputs that existed in the 1950s but that tended steadily to diminish thereafter. Yet today the amount of input that is possible from much more sophisticated business and intellectual circles is, in fact, very much greater than it was at these earlier times. And what I do believe is that a separate overt organization--and only such an organization--would have the possibility of enlisting the kind of continuing outside support and contact to do the job properly.

So I set down this vision at some length, not because I think you ought to decide this question in the near future in this direction, but because I think it will be an absolutely critical decision to be made late this year or early next, and I would hope that you personally would be very deeply involved in it. At any rate, I do hope that you can quietly set about getting the opinions of a great many others with experience of the past as well as the present potential, who may be less thrusting in stating their views than I have been.

No need in any event to reply. I simply wanted to pull my thoughts together for whatever use they may be to you.

With warm regards,

Yours ever,

WPB

William P. Bundy